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REDRESSING INEQUALITY IN THE MARKET
FOR JUSTICE: WHY ACCESS TO LAWYERS
WILL NEVER SOLVE THE PROBLEM AND
WHY RETHINKING THE ROLE OF JUDGES
WILL HELP
Russell G. Pearce*
"To no one will we sell, to no one will we refuse or delay, right or
justice."'
"Equal justice is an implausible ideal; adequate access to justice is
2
less poetic but more imaginable.",
The organized bar is in denial. It refuses to acknowledge that our
legal system promises equal justice under law, but allows justice to be
bought and sold.3 Instead, the bar limits its attention to a small corner
of this problem-the glaring fact that most low-income people cannot
obtain any lawyer for their civil problems and cannot obtain adequate
representation for their criminal defense.'
As Deborah Rhode
* Professor of Law, Fordham University School of Law; Co-Director, Louis Stein
Center for Law and Ethics. I greatly benefited from the comments of my colleagues
at a Fordham Law School faculty brown bag discussion of this Essay. Special thanks
Russell Engler, Bill Simon, and Brad Wendell for their helpful comments.
1. Deborah L. Rhode, Access to Justice 47 (2004) (quoting the Magna Carta).
2. Deborah L. Rhode, Equal Justice Under Law: Connecting Principle to
Practice,12 Wash. U. J.L. & Pol'y 47, 61 (2003).
3. See, e.g., Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr. et al., Why Lawyers Should Be Allowed to
Advertise: A Market Analysis of Legal Services, 58 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1084, 1089-92, 1112
(1983). For further elaboration of this point, see infra Part I.
4. Richard Zorza, The Disconnect Between the Requirements of Judicial
Neutrality and Those of the Appearance of Neutrality When Parties Appear Pro Se:
Causes, Solutions, Recommendations, and Implications, 17 Geo. J. Legal Ethics 423,
423 (2004). For example, the Fordham Law School Library's quick and non-scientific
survey of the American Bar Association President's column in the ABA Journal from
1992 through 2001 identified at least twenty-five columns highlighting pro bono or
legal services to the poor in contrast to only one suggesting changes in the courts to
make them more accessible to parties without lawyers. See infra app. for these
citations. While focusing on pro bono and legal services, the bar has rejected efforts
to open the market for legal services. See, e.g., Rhode, supra note 1, at 87-96; Deborah
J. Cantrell, The Obligation of Legal Aid Lawyers to Champion Practice by
Nonlawyers, 73 Fordham L. Rev. 883 (2004); Russell G. Pearce, The Professionalism
ParadigmShift: Why DiscardingProfessionalIdeology Will Improve the Conduct and
Reputation of the Bar, 70 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1229, 1267-76 (1995). It has also shown little
interest in efforts to modify client advocacy to include a responsibility for the public
good. For examples of these proposals, see David Luban, Lawyers and Justice (1988);
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observes, "bar discussions of access to justice ... assume that more
access is better, and the trick is how to best achieve it."5 In the
context of civil legal needs, bar leadership has focused, without much
success, on providing more lawyers to low-income people through
increased funding and more pro bono hours.6
Given that our society primarily distributes legal services through
the market and employs an adversary system of justice, the bar's
proposals-if accepted-would have a very limited impact in
advancing equal justice. The proposals address only a small portion of
the inequality within the legal system and do not recognize that our
society cannot provide the vast resources necessary to equalize the
access to justice for low-income people. That does not mean that the
bar should abandon its efforts. Rather, it should admit that these
proposals have more of an effect of easing the suffering of those few
low-income people lucky enough to obtain legal representation and
not of realizing equal justice under law.
Inspired by Deborah Rhode's comprehensive and well-argued
book, Access to Justice,7 and her suggestion that courts should provide
legal information and simple forms to unrepresented parties, this
Essay goes a step further. It proposes replacing-in every case-the
paradigm of judge as passive umpire with the paradigm of judge as
active umpire. Judges, who already take a more active role in
particular courts and particular types of cases, would have an
obligation to ensure that the parties' procedural errors do not deprive
the court of access to relevant evidence and legal arguments. While
this proposal would certainly not eliminate unequal justice, it would at
least be a major step toward reasonably equal justice under law.
I. THE MARKET FOR JUSTICE
The aspiration of equal justice under law implies an absolute
measure of justice and of equality. As a rhetorical flourish, it remains
dominant today. Most lawyers and judges, as well as the general
public, would find appalling the notion that justice can be bought and
sold.8 Nonetheless, the reality is that our legal system largely
distributes legal services through the market and justice through an
adversary system where the quality of legal services has a major
influence. As a result, to a significant degree, justice is bought and
sold and the inevitable result is unequal justice under the law.
William H. Simon, The Practice of Justice: A Theory of Lawyers' Ethics (1998); and
Deborah L. Rhode, Ethical Perspectives on Legal Practice, 37 Stan. L. Rev. 589
(1985).
5. Rhode, supra note 2, at 49.
6. Rhode, supra note 1, at 103-04, 145-46; see also infra app.
7. Rhode, supra note 1.
8. Hazard et al., supra note 3, at 1112-13; see Rhode, supra note 1, at 3
(highlighting the centrality of commitment to equal justice under law).
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A comparison between the ideal paradigms of the adversary and

inquisitorial systems highlights the centrality of legal representation to
the determination of justice in an adversary system.9 An inquisitorial
system employs expert judges to manage and guide a process where
the parties assist them in their search for justice. Inquisitorial judges
conduct investigations, initiate cases, determine the issues, and control
the presentation of evidence." In contrast, the adversary system
paradigm places the parties at the center of the search for justice."

The adversary system assumes that the parties' competitive, individual
pursuit of self-interest results in the most just outcome, for the parties
and for society as a whole." Accordingly, the parties, not the court,
conduct investigations, initiate cases, determine the issues, and control
the presentation of evidence. 3 The court, whether acting through a

judge or a jury, is a neutral umpire. It resolves disputes regarding the
legal issues the parties identify, the admissibility of evidence the
parties have determined is relevant, and decides factual contests the
9. What follows is a description of the inquisitorial and adversarial paradigms. In
practice, a variety of factors can make the two systems more or less similar. See, e.g.,
Mirjan R. Dama~ka, The Faces of Justice and State Authority: A Comparative
Approach to the Legal Process 3-6 (1986).
10. John H. Langbein, The German Advantage in Civil Procedure, 52 U. Chi. L.
Rev. 823, 826 (1985); see also Matthew T. King, Security, Scale, Form, and Function:
The Search for Truth and the Exclusion of Evidence in Adversarial and Inquisitorial
Justice Systems, 12 Int'l Legal Persp. 185, 187-88 (2001-02); Judith Resnik, Managerial
Judges, 96 Harv. L. Rev. 374, 380 n.24, 380-88 (1982).
11. John H. Langbein, The Origins of Adversary Criminal Trial 1-2, 8-9 (A.W.
Brian Simpson ed., 2003); Abram Chayes, The Role of the Judge in Public Law
Litigation, 89 Harv. L. Rev. 1281, 1283 (1976); Resnik, supra note 10, at 380 n.3, 38081.
12. Richard Posner has observed that the adversary system "resembles the market
in its impersonality, its subordination of distributive considerations. The invisible
hand of the market has its counterpart in the aloof disinterest of the judge." Richard
Other commentators have
A. Posner, Economic Analysis of Law 322 (1972).
similarly compared the principles of the market to those of the adversary system. See,
e.g., Rob Atkinson, Connecting Business Ethics and Legal Ethics for the Common
Good: Come, Let Us Reason Together, 29 J.Corp. L. 469, 484, 488 (2004); Robert F.
Cochran, Jr., Professionalism in the Postmodern Age: Its Death, Attempts at
Resuscitation, and Alternative Sources of Virtue, 14 Notre Dame J.L. Ethics & Pub.
Pol'y 305, 312 (2000); David Luban, The Social Responsibility of Lawyers: A Green
Perspective, 63 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 955, 974 (1995); W. Bradley Wendel, Professional
Roles and Moral Agency, 89 Geo. L.J. 667, 698-99 (2001) (reviewing Arthur Isak
Applbaum, Ethics for Adveraries: The Morality of Roles in Public and Professional
Life (1999)). Many commentators have questioned whether the adversary system
does indeed produce the most just result. See, e.g., Langbein, supra note 11, at 1-2;
Richard A. Posner, Overcoming Law 503 (1995) (describing justification of adversary
system as "mystical faith"); David Luban, Twenty Theses on Adversarial Ethics, in
Beyond the Adversarial System 134, 143-44 (Helen Stacy & Michael Lavarch eds.,
1999). Some commentators have offered "nonconsequentialist justifications of the
adversary system" which do not rely on the justness of the outcome. Luban, supra
note 4, at 81-103; Monroe Freedman & Abbe Smith, Understanding Lawyer's Ethics
19-23 (2002).
13. Langbein, supra note 11, at 1; Chayes, supra note 11, at 1283; Resnik, supra
note 10, at 380 n.23, 380-88.
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parties have placed before it.14 For purposes of this Essay, I will refer

to the work of the party or the party's representative in preparing and
presenting a case as "lawyering," whether performed by the party's
lawyer or by the self-represented party.

Where the parties have such great control of the process, the quality
of their lawyering efforts undoubtedly has a major influence on the

outcome. 5 Precise measurement of this advantage is difficult. Other
factors, such as the weight of relevant authority and available
evidence, are likely to be significant influences as well. Accordingly,

where the relative merits are comparable, the quality of lawyering will
make a greater difference than where the relative merits vary greatly.
Although a strong lawyer will win easily with a strong case, even a
weak lawyer will have a good chance. But even the evaluation of
what is a weak or strong case may vary; an excellent lawyer may be
able to discover that what looks like a weak case is actually a strong

one. While precise quantification of the effect of lawyering awaits
further development, the strong influence of lawyering appears
beyond dispute. 6

Given this strong influence, the use of the market as the primary

mechanism17 for distributing legal services guarantees significantly
unequal justice under law. 8 The more resources a party has, the

better quality lawyering they can buy.' 9 Parties with better lawyering
are better able to achieve their goals in the legal system. In effect,
wealthier parties have the capacity to buy more justice.20 Rather than
being the exception, inequality under law is more frequently the rule.

14. See supra note 11 and accompanying text.
15. See, e.g., Atkinson, supra note 12, at 488; Marc Galanter, Why the "Haves"
Come Out Ahead?: Speculation on the Limits of Legal Change, 9 Law & Soc'y Rev.
95 (1974); Hazard et al., supra note 3, at 1112 (noting that where "lawyers differ in
skill, knowledge, and the time they can devote to a case.... justice-actual outcomes
in the legal system-is related to the quality of lawyering that a client can afford");
Marvin E. Frankel, An Immodest Proposal,N.Y. Times, Dec. 4, 1977, (Magazine), at
92.
16. See supra note 15 and accompanying text.
17. Some exceptions exist. The government and, to a lesser degree, the bar
provide services to the poor.
18. I do not mean to imply that the market for legal services is efficient. Indeed,
the bar has created significant barriers to competition, such as restrictions on who can
deliver legal services and who can have an ownership interest in firms delivering legal
services. As a result, the price of legal services is significantly higher and the quality
lower than what would result from an efficient market. See, e.g., Cantrell, supra note
4; Derek A. Denckla, Nonlawyers and the Unauthorized Practice of Law: An
Overview of the Legal and Ethical Parameters,67 Fordham L. Rev. 2581, 2599 (1999);
Pearce, supra note 4, at 1272-73.
19. See infra note 15.
20. Langbein describes this as the "wealth effect." Langbein, supra note 11, at 1-2,
102-03.
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II.How MUCH INEQUALITY EXISTS IN THE MARKET FOR JUSTICE?

Current measures of the extent of unequal justice under law are
quite gross and anecdotal. Absent an agreement on how to measure
either justice or equality,21 commentators tend instead to focus on
"equal access to the justice system" as a surrogate.22 But that measure
also suffers from a lack of clarity. Determining equality requires a
definition of legal need and lawyering quality to permit a comparison
between similarly situated persons. Not only are these measures
absent, but market analysis suggests that those needs are themselves
dynamic and not easily susceptible to quantification.23
Nonetheless the gross, if somewhat indeterminate, inequality of our
legal system in civil litigation is overwhelming. 24 Rhode finds that
"[m]illions of Americans lack any access to justice, let alone equal
access." 25 In civil proceedings, most low- and middle-income people
lack any affordable access to legal services, while in the criminal
justice system, the government funded access for those who cannot
afford their own is demonstrably inadequate. "According to most
estimates," notes Rhode, "about four-fifths of the civil legal needs of
the poor, and two- to three-fifths of the needs of middle-income
individuals, remain unmet."26 She observes that "[o]nly one lawyer is
available to serve approximately 9,000 low-income persons, compared
with one for every 240 middle- and upper-income Americans. "27 With
regard to middle-income Americans, Rhode estimates that
"[m]illions" of them are "priced out of the legal process. 28 As
Richard Zorza adds, "[i]n many2 9courts, well over [fifty] percent of
litigants appear without lawyers.

21. Rhode, supra note 1, at 5.
22. Id.
23. Id.; Hazard et al., supra note 3, at 1091-92.
24. By focusing on civil litigation, I do not mean to imply that equality abounds in
criminal litigation. Even though indigent defendants have a legal right to courtappointed counsel in criminal cases, Rhode points to studies consistently observing
that they do not receive adequate representation. The appointed lawyers often lack
"experience or expertise in criminal defense," fail to perform competently, do not
receive enough compensation to fund required research and preparation, and do not
have the resources to conduct the necessary investigations. Rhode, supra note 1, at
122, 123-29. Rhode concludes that "[g]overnment legal aid and criminal defense
budgets are capped at ludicrous levels, which make effective assistance of counsel a
statistical impossibility for most low income litigants." Id at 3.
25. Id.
26. Id.
27. Rhode, supra note 2, at 47-48.
28. Rhode, supra note 1, at 103.
29. Zorza, supra note 4, at 423 n.1.
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III. THE BAR'S PREFERRED SOLUTION: PROVIDING LAWYERS FOR
THE POOR

Bar leaders have sought to address the problem of unequal justice
under law through efforts to increase dramatically both funding and
lawyer pro bono contributions.3" They recommend major increases in
government funding for civil legal services as well as increased
contributions from lawyers.31 They also urge strategies to persuade
lawyers to provide many more pro bono hours than the existing
average of "less than half an hour a week and ...half a dollar a day"
and to redirect efforts to helping the poor from the current emphasis
on "assist[ing] family, friends, and charitable causes that largely
benefit middle and upper income groups."32 These strategies range
from mandatory pro bono requirements to mandatory disclosure of
pro bono hours, or33voluntary commitment to provide a minimum pro
bono contribution.
IV.

WHY ACCESS TO LAWYERS WILL NEVER SOLVE THE PROBLEM
OF UNEQUAL JUSTICE

Access to lawyers will make only a limited difference in the equality
of justice. Undoubtedly, the difference it makes will be important to
some individuals. One study, for example, found that the vast
majority of tenants evicted in housing courts did not have a lawyer
and that none of the tenants in an experimental bar pro bono program
had been evicted. 34 Providing low-income people with lawyers will
mitigate the harms they might face in the legal system. Nonetheless,
given the market distribution of legal services, proposals for providing
lawyers to the poor will never eradicate inequality. A market
perspective reveals at least three very real limits on these efforts.
First, even if all low-income people received legal representation,
substantial inequality would remain.35 While those low-income people
would be better off, market distribution of legal services would remain
the rule. Parties with greater resources would be able to purchase a
higher quality of legal services and better absorb the costs of
litigation.3 6 This factor alone would guarantee significant inequality
among those parties who have retained lawyers, as well as between
those with lawyers and those without.

30. Rhode, supra note 1, at 187-90; see also infra app.
31. Rhode, supra note 1, at 103-04, 145-46; see infra app.
32. Rhode, supra note 1, at 17.
33. Id. at 16-18.
34. Comm. to Improve the Availability of Legal Servs., Final Report to the Chief
Judge of the State of N.Y. 17 (1990).
35. Gary Bellow & Jeanne Kettleson, From Ethics to Politics: Confronting
Scarcity and Fairnessin PublicInterest Practice,58 B.U. L. Rev. 337, 382-83 (1978).
36. Id.

2004]

REDRESSING INEQUALITY

Second, even the effort to provide low-income people with lawyers
faces the impossible challenge of providing resources for an elastic
need.3 1 More than twenty-five years ago, Gary Bellow and Jeanne
Kettelson observed that legal needs "have a tendency to expand as
potential beneficiaries see lawyers as capable of responding to their
problems."38 Accordingly, when free legal services are made available
to the poor, "demand for services will increase to the limits of the
available supply."39
Third, Bellow and Kettleson recognized that society could never
provide the resources necessary to provide quality legal services to
low-income people. They noted that "even if demand for legal
services remained constant.., it would not be possible or desirable to
expand the bar to meet the need."4 They explained that "to equalize
the number of lawyers available to the very poor and the rest of the
population" would require "[a] tenfold increase in the existing public
interest bar" and that "to begin to provide the whole population with
the same legal services that the affluent presently enjoy ... would
require something on the order of a tenfold increase in the size of the
entire bar."41
Given these limits, any effort to make significant progress toward
equal justice would at least require other changes in the legal system.42
One obvious place to look is the courts.
V. MAKING JUDGES RESPONSIBLE FOR REDRESSING FAILURES IN
THE MARKET FOR JUSTICE

The potential for the courts to equalize justice has received far less
attention from bar leaders than proposals for providing more lawyers
for the poor in civil cases and more resources for the criminal defense
of indigents.43 State courts, together with commentators such as Jonah
Goldschmidt, Russell Engler, Deborah Rhode, and Richard Zorza,
have focused their efforts on assisting parties without lawyers in the
courts." In the context of providing justice to these parties, courts and

37. Id. at 380; see also Hazard et. al, supra note 3, at 1091-92; Rhode, supra note 2,
at 49.
38. Bellow & Kettleson, supra note 35, at 380; see Rhode, supra note 2, at 49.
39. Bellow & Kettleson, supra note 35, at 380.
40. Id.
41. Id. (italics omitted).
42. Bellow and Kettleson take a different tack than that explored in this Essay.
Like other commentators, they urge a change in lawyer norms "to protect weak
parties from being exploited by more powerful opponents." Id. at 387. For more
developed perspectives of this kind, see Luban, supra note 4; Rhode, supra note 4;
and Simon, supra note 4.
43. Zorza, supra note 4, at 423; see infra app.
44. Rhode, supra note 1, at 81-86; Russell Engler, And Justice for All-Including
the Unrepresented Poor: Revisiting the Roles of the Judges, Mediators, and Clerks, 67
Fordham L. Rev. 1987 (1999); Jona Goldschmidt, The Pro Se Litigant's Struggle for
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commentators have considered or implemented proposals to place
self-represented parties who cannot afford a lawyer on more equal
footing by providing them with basic information on the law and
procedures, as well as with forms and sometimes assistance in drafting
pleadings and other court papers. Commentators have also suggested
expanding the use of small claims courts and alternative dispute
resolution where the proceedings are less formal and legal expertise is
less important."
Within these proposals, disagreement exists as to how far the court
may go in assisting the self-represented party. The range of views
includes limiting the assistance to the self-represented to providing
forms without elaboration, providing information but not advice,
allowing court clerks but not judges to provide assistance, and having
both clerks and judges provide generous assistance.46
Russell Engler and Richard Zorza, in particular, argue that judges
should shift from serving as passive umpires to active umpires with
responsibility for keeping the process fair where one or more parties is
self-represented.4 7 Engler argues that "[t]he judge bears the 'heavy
responsibility' for presiding over a 'fair' proceeding, which includes
not only what occurs at trial itself, but outcomes produced by the
more common result of settlement."48 This entails making the judge
responsible for "'develop[ing] a full and fair record,"' 49 including
providing "assist[ance to] the unrepresented litigant on procedure to
be followed, presentation of evidence, and questions of law," as well
as "call[ing] witnesses and conduct[ing] direct or cross-examinations"
on the court's initiative.5" Zorza's approach does not go quite as far,
but does make the judge responsible for ensuring that the selfrepresented party has "the greatest possible opportunity to be
heard,"5 including explaining the proceedings at every step and
making sure that the parties understand the explanation, describing
what the parties need to prove, explaining relevant evidentiary issues
and establishing whether foundations exist, preventing a lawyer from
taking advantage of a self-represented party, and referring a selfrepresented party for advice to a self help center or other expert

Access to Justice: Meeting the Challenge of Bench and Bar Resistance, 40 Fain. Ct.
Rev. 36 (2002); Zorza, supra note 4, at 423.
45. See supra note 44.
46. Engler, supra note 44, at 1992-2021; Zorza, supra note 4, at 435.
47. Engler, supra note 44; Zorza, supra note 4. Commentators have made similar
arguments in the context of mediation. See, e.g., Jacqueline M. Nolan-Haley, Court
Mediation and the Search for Justice Through Law, 74 Wash. U. L.Q. 47 (1996).
48. Engler, supra note 44, at 2028.
49. Id. (quoting Lashley v,Sec'y of Health and Human Servs., 708 F.2d 1048, 1051
(6th Cir. 1983) (quoting McConnell v. Schweiker, 655 F.2d 604, 606 (5th Cir. 1981))).
50. Id. Engler draws on precedents developed in small claims courts and
administrative social security proceedings. See id. at 2016-18, 2028-31.
51. Zorza, supra note 4, at 442.
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where appropriate. 52 Both Engler and Zorza emphasize that they
intend these proposals to maintain and improve the adversary system
by correcting process errors resulting from the ignorance of
unrepresented parties. 3
Proposals like Zorza's are part of a larger trend toward increasing
the managerial role of judges in the adversary system. In his classic
1976 article, The Role of the Judge in Public Law Litigation,54 Abram
Chayes described the rise of a "public law litigation model" where the
judge "is active, with responsibility ...for organizing and shaping the
litigation to ensure a just and viable outcome."5 5 This approach
spread self-consciously to mass tort cases, as well as to federal
litigation generally where, as Judith Resnik described in her famous
article, ManagerialJudges, judges controlled pre-trial proceedings and
Recently, state courts have begun
encouraged settlements.5 6
experiments with specialized courts in areas like drug treatment and
domestic violence where judges manage the proceedings as leaders of
a "problem-solving team" that includes the parties and social services
providers57 and serve as monitors of court sanctions. 8
These trends, together with the developments in providing
assistance to self-represented parties, point toward an effective means
of reducing inequality under law. Rather than limit these approaches
to particular courts, particular cases, or particular parties, we can
extend their underlying principle to all cases and all courts. Rather
than serving as a passive umpire, judges should be active umpires
responsible for remedying process errors that would deprive the court
of relevant evidence and arguments and that would ensure informed
consent to settlements.5 9 For example, if a party, whether represented
or not, was unable to master the evidence rules necessary to enter
relevant evidence, the judge should ask questions to determine
52. Id. at 442-45.
53. Engler, supra note 44, at 2022-27; Zorza, supra note 4, at 429 n.15. Zorza
distinguishes his proposals, which are aimed at improving the adversary system from a
similar approach grounded in the values of the inquisitorial system. Id. (contrasting
his view with that of Jonah Goldschmidt).
54. Chayes, supra note 11.
55. Id. at 1302.
56. Resnik, supra note 10, at 379-80. Where Chayes expressed enthusiasm about
these developments, Resnik urged caution. See Chayes, supra note 11; Resnik, supra
note 10, at 380,414-45.
57. Judith S. Kaye, Changing Courts in Changing Times: The Need for a Fresh
Look at How Courts Are Run, 48 Hastings L.J. 851, 862 (1997); see also Greg Berman
& John Feinblatt, Judges and Problem-Solving Courts (2002).
58. Judith S. Kaye, Delivering Justice Today: A Problem-Solving Approach, 22
Yale L. & Pol'y Rev. 125 (2004); see Berman & Feinblatt, supra note 57. See generally
Michael C. Dorf & Jeffrey A. Fagan, Problem-Solving Courts: From Innovation to
Institutionalization,40 Am. Crim. L. Rev 1501 (2003); Michael C. Dorf & Charles F.
Sabel, Drug Treatment Courts and Emergent Experimentalist Government, 53 Vand.
L. Rev. 831 (2000).
59. See supra note 53.
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whether the evidence is admissible and, if so, accept it. Similarly, the60
court should raise relevant legal issues the parties have missed.
Although some judges do some of these things some of the time on an
ad hoc basis,6' making the judge an active umpire would change what
is now ad hoc and unofficial into a standard and officially sanctioned
procedure.
First,
A number of challenges to this approach will arise.
oppose
deviations
supporters of the pure adversary system model will
from the passive umpire role.62 As described above, in addition to the
arguments from the needs of equal justice and the evolution of the
judge's role, as a practical matter some judges do precisely what this
Essay proposes. While making little change for those judges, this
Essay's proposal would make this conduct systemic and transparent.
Second, supporters of the adversary system model may argue that the
active umpire model represents a change to the inquisitorial system.
True, the active umpire does take more control from the parties than
a passive umpire. But the process remains party-controlled unless
process failures require judicial correction. This system is different
than the inquisitorial system, in which the expert judge has control of
all aspects of litigation.63 Third, supporters of the adversary system
model may assert that the active umpire model increases the danger
that judicial bias or incompetence will influence the outcome. Judicial
bias and incompetence are problems whether the judge is passive or
active. While the more active role of the judge will arguably increase
the effect of these problems on the outcome, it will also make the
problems more visible and therefore more susceptible of melioration.
CONCLUSION

This Essay does not purport to offer the last word on the market for
justice and unequal justice under law. It does draw on Deborah
Rhode's excellent work to suggest that the bar should openly and
honestly acknowledge that justice today is largely bought and sold
through the market for legal services. The Essay recommends that
the market distribution of legal services circumscribes strategies
designed to provide some poor people with a lawyer. At best, they
are properly described as efforts to mitigate harms and not as
significant steps toward equal justice under law. More likely, to
60. This proposal tracks the suggestions Engler and Zorza make for cases with
self-represented parties. See supra notes 47-53 and accompanying text.
61. I would like to thank my colleague Jim Cohen for making sure I included this
point.
62. See, e.g., Robert M. Daniszewski, Coping with the Pro Se Litigant, N.H. B. J.,
Mar. 1995, at 46, 48; Resnik, supra note 10, at 380, 414-45; Bruce D. Sales et al., Is
Self-Representation a Reasonable Alternative to Attorney Representation in Divorce
Cases?, 37 St. Louis U. L.J. 553, 558 (1992).
63. See supra notes 51-52.
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provide such a significant step would be making judges active umpires
responsible for correcting process failures. But stating the problem
and acknowledging the key role of judges are only first steps. Exactly
how to make judges active umpires is a task requiring much further
consideration.

64. This elaboration would include consideration of the role of court employees,
see, e.g., Engler, supra note 44, at 2031, as well as delineation of the circumstances
requiring, and the appropriate forms of, judicial intervention.
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APPENDIX

A quick, unscientific survey of the columns of the ABA Presidents
in the ABA Journal for the years 1992 to 2001 identified the following
25 columns on pro bono or legal services, in chronological order.
Talbot "Sandy" D'Alemberte, Seeking Fairnessin Justice Reform: A
Challenge to the Vice President, A.B.A. J., Jan. 1992, at 10; Talbot
"Sandy" D'Alemberte, Florida's New Pro Bono Program: A Bold
Step Toward Access to Justice, A.B.A. J., Apr. 1992, at 8; J. Michael
McWilliams, Making Time for Pro Bono: Volunteer Service Must Be
More Accessible to Lawyers, as Well as Clients, A.B.A. J., Apr. 1993,
at 8; J. Michael McWilliams, Keeping the Dream Alive: Law Day
Message: Justicefor All-All for Justice, A.B.A. J., May 1993, at 8; J.
Michael McWilliams, Meeting to Advance a Common Goal:
Renowned Speakers, Marshall Tribute to Emphasize "Justicefor All, "
A.B.A. J., June 1993, at 8; J. Michael McWilliams, DwindlingJudicial
Resources: Chronic Underfunding Leading to Delays, Reduced
Services, Shutdowns, A.B.A. J., July 1993, at 8; R. William Ide, III,
Rebuilding the Public's Trust: Working Toward an Improved Justice
System and Renewed Respect for Lawyers, A.B.A. J., Sept. 1993, at 8;
Llewelyn Pritchard, Coming to America: Lawyers Can Shape
Tomorrow by Opening Legal Doors for Newcomers, A.B.A. J., Nov.
1994, at 8; George E. Bushnell, Jr., Time to Shift Focus: Bar Needs to
Emphasize Public Service, Worry Less About "Image Problem,"
A.B.A. J., Jan. 1995, at 6; Roberta Cooper Ramo, Defending
American Democracy: Lawyers Play a Key Role in Ensuring that the
Constitution Remains Vibrant, A.B.A. J., Sept. 1995, at 8; Roberta
Cooper Ramo, Letter from the Front: Support for Constitutional
Awareness and Lawyers Involvement Is Ongoing, A.B.A. J., Nov.
1995, at 8; N. Lee Cooper, Don't Forget the Main Street Lawyer:
These Heroes of the Profession Go About Their Work Quietly, One
Client at a Time, A.B.A. J., Jan. 1997, at 8; Jerome J. Shestack,
Defining Our Calling, Focus on Professionalism Benefits Individual
Lawyers and Justice as a Whole, A.B.A. J., Sept. 1997, at 8; Jerome J.
Shestack, Respecting Our Profession: In this Difficult Profession, Let
Us Try to Earn Our Self-Respect, A.B.A. J., Dec. 1997, at 8; Jerome J.
Shestack, The Pro Bono Principle: Lawyers Owe It to the Professionand Humanity-to Lend a Hand to the Needy, A.B.A. J., Feb. 1998, at 8;
Jerome J. Shestack, Advancing Professionalism Needs Judicial Help,
A.B.A. J., Apr. 1998, at 8; Jerome J. Shestack, Our Continuing
Professional Odyssey, A.B.A. J., Aug. 1998, at 8; Philip S. Anderson,
In Defense of Detainees, A.B.A. J., Mar. 1999, at 6; William G. Paul,
ABA-A Home for All Lawyers, A.B.A. J., Apr. 2000, at 8; Martha
W. Barnett, Angels of Justice, A.B.A. J., Dec. 2000, at 10; Martha W.
Barnett, Dark Discoveries, New Hope: The ABA Aids Immigrant
Detainees Facing UncertainFutures, A.B.A. J., Feb. 2001, at 8; Martha
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W. Barnett, Reflections, A.B.A. J., Aug. 2001, at 8; Robert E. Hirshon,
On Law and Lobstering, A.B.A. J., Sept. 2001, at 10; Robert E.
Hirshon, Graduating Under Pressure, A.B.A. J., Nov. 2001, at 6;
Robert E. Hirshon, To the Heroes Among Us, A.B.A. J., Dec. 2001, at
10. Only one column discussed changing the courts to make it easier
for unrepresented parties. Talbot "Sandy" D'Alemberte, Florida's
New Pro Bono Program: A Bold Step Toward Access to Justice,
A.B.A. J., Apr. 1992, at 8. Other columns discussing the judiciary
focused on defending judicial independence, see Jerome J. Shestack,
Defining Our Calling: Focus on Professionalism Benefits Individual
Lawyers and Justice As a Whole, A.B.A. J., Sept. 1997, at 8, or
promoting alternative dispute resolution as a way of promoting
reconciliation or reducing caseloads. See, e.g., J. Michael McWilliams,
Dwindling Judicial Resources: Chronic Underfunding Leading to
Delays, Reduced Services, Shutdowns, A.B.A. J., July 1993, at 8;
Roberta Cooper Ramo, Lawyers as Peacemakers: Our Navajo Peers
Could Teach Us a Thing or Two About Conflict Resolution, A.B.A. J.,
Dec. 1995, at 6.
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